
brokered, negotiated, or otherwise helped to bring about informal settle-
ments.”
3
Early modern states became modern, in other words, by seam-
lessly integrating what in social theory have often been seen as opposing
categories: centralized/decentralized, personal/public, legal/customary.
Exposing the misguidedness of those theoretical binaries, early modern
legal cultures took their strength from a rich bricolage of social and
political interaction.
Looking at state organization complicates the implicit narrative that
early modern state-building leads to the nation state. It might have
eventually, but in these centuries, states were pluralistic. European states
ran a continuum from fairly unitary monarchies in which kings still had
to cooperate with parliamentary, noble and other social institutions
(England and France), to what Charles Tilly calls states with “fragmented
sovereignty” (Switzerland, northern Italy and some of the Holy Roman
Empire), where power was shared among loose confederations of city
states, principalities and the like. Many others were land-bound empires:
the Ottomans in an arc to the south, Poland–Lithuania, Russia from the
Baltic to Siberia, the Habsburgs from Spain to the Netherlands to
Hungary. As in their heartlands, rulers of multi-religious, multi-ethnic
empires were forced, according to Karen Barkey, to “share control with a
variety of intermediary organizations and with local elites, religious and
local governing bodies, and numerous other privileged institutions.” They
unified their empires primarily around a supranational religious ideology;
they controlled by strategies from toleration of difference, to co-optation
of elites, to measures to prevent regional elites from building local power,
to coercion. So implicated were imperial governments in negotiating with
local communities to accomplish extraction and control that scholars call
imperial sovereignty “layered,” “divided” or “delegated”: “Sovereignty is
often more myth than reality, more a story that polities tell about their
own power than a definite quality they possess.”
4
A further perspective on early modern state-building explores the
relationship of power to violence. Michel Foucault argued that early
modern European rulers governed by terror through “spectacles of
suffering” – mass public executions and punishments – until in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they were able gradually to substi-
tute discourses of conformity internalized by individuals, inculcated with
3
Brewer and Hellmuth, “Introduction,” 11–12. Breen, “Patronage, Politics.”
4
Tilly, Coercion, Capital, 20–31; Barkey, Empire of Difference, 9–15, quote on 10; Benton, Search for
Sovereignty, 30–3, “myth” quote on 279. Burbank and Cooper on empire and nation: Empires, 1–3.
Introduction 3
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