Henri Tajfel's 'Individuals and Groups in Social Psychology' explores the dynamics of social behavior, emphasizing the interplay between individual actions and group contexts. The paper critiques the individualistic bias in social psychology, arguing for a more integrated approach that considers social systems. Tajfel outlines a theory of inter-group behavior, highlighting the significance of social categorization and identity in shaping interactions. This work is essential for students and researchers interested in social psychology, group dynamics, and the psychological underpinnings of social behavior.

Key Points

  • Analyzes the individualistic bias in social psychology research.
  • Presents a theory of inter-group behavior focusing on social categorization.
  • Discusses the dynamic interaction between individual motivations and group processes.
  • Critiques mainstream social psychology for neglecting broader social contexts.
Mahak Torabi
8 pages
Language:English
Type:Article
Sociology
Mahak Torabi
8 pages
Language:English
Type:Article
Sociology
281
/ 8
British Journal
of
Social and Clinical Psychology
(1979),
18,
183-190
Printed
in
Great Britain
Individuals and groups in social psychology*
Henri Tajfel
183
In
a recent paper, Taylor
&
Brown have argued that, although
research
in
social psychology needs to take
into account the social context of social behaviour, the
theories
should aim at the explanation of
individual
behaviour. The present paper argues against this view as it applies to some important issues
in
social
psychology. First, it is contended that the ‘individualistic’ bias of research in social psychology derives from
the nature of the theories dominating the discipline. Second, a theory of inter-group behaviour is briefly
outlined
in
order to show that its structure and aims are different
in
some important ways from the
individualistic theories. The bias of these theories which is due to their assumption that social behaviour
takes place inside homogeneous and unstructured social systems is illustrated using as examples the theory
of belief similarity
in
prejudice and equity theory.
I
find much to agree with in the paper by Taylor
&
Brown (1979) (which will be referred to as
T
&
B
from now
on).
Their argument goes in three stages. First, they agree with the criticisms
some of us have made
of
the near-monopoly
of
the ‘individual’ and ‘inter-individual’ research in
social psychology. This led to the neglect
of
a
broader perspective in which social behaviour
would be seen as a ‘dynamic interaction
’
between psychological processes and the nature
of
the
social systems inside which this behaviour takes place. T
&
B provide
a
summary
of
some
of
these earlier criticisms: (i) too much research
on
individual and inter-individual behaviour rather
than groups; (ii) ‘naive extrapolations from individual to the groups’; (iii) divorce
of
the studies
of
interpersonal phenomena from their ‘wider societal context
’.
The second stage
of
the T
&
B argument is that these criticisms are justified with respect to
social psychological research, but that the theories will have
to
continue dealing with individuals
in order to remain within the domain
of
the fundamental interests and preoccupations of
psychology. The third stage
of
the argument consists of attempting to show, using
as
examples
two theories formulated by the ‘critics’ (Moscovici, 1976; Tajfel, 1974, 1978; Tajfel
&
Turner,
1979): (i) that these theories remain essentially ‘individual’; (ii) that their value lies precisely in
the fact that they have remained ‘individual’ while managing to contextualize social behaviour in
its interaction with group phenomena; and (iii) that the sooner this is openly acknowledged, the
easier it will be for these theoretical developments, which T
&
B consider important, to
influence beneficially the ‘mainstream
’
of
social psychology.
In
other words, T
&
B state that social behaviour originates from, and pertains to, individuals.
Whatever ‘non-individual
’
variables may affect it (such as ‘groups
’,
‘social context
’,
etc.), useful
social psychological theories must remain at this individual level. The two recent theories
discussed by T
&
B have done precisely this, despite their protestations to the contrary. Like
M. Jourdain we were speaking prose, but we didn’t know it.
My agreement with T
&
B stops at the end
of
the first sentence of the above summary
paragraph. The statement about social behaviour originating from, and being performed by,
individuals is entirely unexceptionable and trivially true. But immediately afterwards the
difficulties begin. The
bourgeois-gentilhomme
may have been speaking prose without knowing it,
but Molikre never informed us whether the result was good prose or bad prose. To say that in
the last analysis we are concerned with individual social behaviour is as true as it is meaningless
until and unless some useful and interesting statements are made about the characteristics
of
this
*
This
paper
started
off
as
a
brief
rejoinder
to
the
article
by
Taylor
&
Brown.
As
the
work
proceeded,
it
became
clear
that
the
issues
raised
by
Taylor
&
Brown
were
too
important
to
be
dismissed
or
discussed
in
a
few
summary
paragraphs.
The
‘rejoinder’
became
longer.
OOO7-1293/79/0602-0183 $02.00/0
@
1979
The British Psychological
Society
184
Henri Tajfel
behaviour and the kind of theoretical approach which will be needed to understand these
characteristics.
Research and theory in ‘individualistic
’
social psychology
Let us start with the T
&
B distinction between ‘research’ and ‘theories’. The examples of
research provided by T
&
B originate from the frustration aggression theory as applied to ‘the
collective discontent
of
a group
’;
gaming approaches to conflict; the theories of attribution,
of
dissonance, of interpersonal attraction,
of
attitude formation and change, of social comparison,
of
social influence.
For
some reasons (unexplained
in
the T
&
B paper)
all
these social
psychological theories have led to research which can be, as T
&
B agree, justifiably criticized
for its neglect
of
the social context of social behaviour. An obvious question arises: if this has
really happened because of some (haphazardly determined?) directions of research rather than
the nature of the theories,
how come that the above list includes practically
all
of the
‘mainstream’
of
the last 40 years
or
so,
with no more than
a
few half-forgotten puddles left behind
here and there?
As
I wrote a few years ago:
‘.
. .
many
of
the theories which dominate the
present research output
in
social psychology are not sociopsychological. It is therefore
unavoidable that most
of
the experiments designed to test these theories should be equally
impervious to the wider realities of social conduct and share their focus on the strategies of
individual and inter-individual adjustments
’
(Tajfel, 1972
a,
p. 94).
with the nature and explanatory targets of the theories from which the research derived. But I
suspect that T
&
B would agree with this despite the confusing distinction between ‘research’
and ‘theories
’
introduced in their paper. Within their self-imposed limitations these theories have
been extremely useful
in
helping
us
to explain some fundamental aspects
of
human social
behaviour. But it looks as
if
other
theories are needed to do the job not previously done:
namely, to take into account the ‘dynamic interaction’ between individual behaviour and its
wider social scenario. As already stated, T
&
B see no difference
of
principle between these
other theories and the earlier ones, since
-
in the last analysis
-
they must all be concerned with
‘individuals
’.
It is because of this essential agreement that we must all share about ‘individuals’ that
T
&
B
have led themselves into something which looks like a semantic confusion whirling around a
strawman. As they wrote: ‘Only when social reality is accounted for, not just as
it
influences
behaviour in a static function but as a truly dynamic and interactive relationship
of
the individual
and social structure, will social psychological theory be sufficiently comprehensive.’ But also, the
‘basic theoretical building blocks’
of
the inter-group theory which they describe (e.g. Tajfel
&
Turner, 1979) ‘are individualistic in nature’ and, according to them, should remain
so.
Individual processes and collective behaviour in the theory
of
inter-group behaviour
The ‘individualistic’ description of the inter-group theory
in
the T
&
B paper is simply achieved:
of its three important aspects one only is described because, presumably,
T
&
B consider it to
be more fundamental than the other two. In a recent text (Tajfel, 1978) the theory is described as
a ‘conceptual tripod
’
which enables us, because of the convergence of
all
of its three lines
of
thought,
to
make predictions and achieve more understanding about the social psychological
aspects of inter-group relations. The ‘support
’
of
the tripod described by
T
&
B
is the sequence
of social categorization
-
social identity
-
social comparison. This sequence, as they rightly say,
consists ‘ultimately
’
of individual processes. They admit that ‘group processes are,
of
course,
fundamental to the theory; however, it is their dynamic and bidirectional interaction with the
individual and his motivations and aspirations which makes it truly
a
social psychological theory
of intergroup behaviour
’.
If there was
no
more to it than that,
T
&
B’s argument would have been entirely justified. The
In other words, the problem seems to lie not with directions
of
research, as T
&
B write, but
20448260a, 1979, 2, Downloaded from https://bpspsychub.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2044-8260.1979.tb00324.x by University College London, Wiley Online Library on [25/01/2026]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Individuals and groups
in
social psychology
185
processes of social categorization, social identity and social comparison, as used
in
the theory,
cannot be conceived to originate outside of their social contexts. But they can also be shown to
function in some ways which are basically the same
in
group, inter-individual and even
non-social settings. For social categorization, this is the case, in some conditions, for general
judgement processes (e.g. Tajfel,
1959;
Eiser
&
Stroebe,
1972).
The notion of social identity is
based
on
the simple motivational assumption that
individuals
(at least in our culture) prefer a
positive to a negative self-image. The idea of social comparison originated with Festinger’s
fully
inter-individual theory
(1954).
In view of these important similarities between the
‘individualistic
’
conceptions of social categorization, social identity and social comparison and
those used
in
the presently discussed theory of inter-group behaviour, what is the nature of the
differences
between this kind of theory and others?
A
full description of these differences is obviously not possible
in
this paper (cf. Tajfel,
1978).
It will be useful, however, to outline the general structure which will help to locate the concepts
of social categorization, social identity and social comparison
in
the total pattern and show that
they cannot be considered, as they are by T
&
B, to be the core of the whole enterprise. Let me
state that the emphasis chosen here reflects my own views and need not be shared by some of
my
colleagues who have contributed in crucial ways to the development of our work
-
including
amongst others Rupert Brown and Donald Taylor. It is perhaps superfluous to add that our past
and present disagreements are and have been as useful as our agreements in enabling
us
to
extend our work
in
new directions.
An
important aspect of ‘social reality’ is that most social systems contain collections of
individuals who differ from each other
in
a variety of ways. Some of these differences can easily
be ascertained to exist by an outside ‘objective’ and uncommitted observer; for example,
differences
in
sex, age, wealth, power, forms of work, forms of leisure, dress, language, etc.
The observer has certain tools which will enable him to structure these differences
in
one way or
another, i.e. to establish his own ‘construction
’
of any particular social ‘reality
’.
This is often
attempted in an ‘outside
’
stance by sociologists, social anthropologists or social historians. The
individuals inside the system have also tools to do this kind of job; the tools used by both the
outsiders and the insiders are not dissimilar. But the
criteria
for accepting the validity of one
construction or another may differ vastly between those who engage in the ‘outside’
construction for their professional (‘scientific
’)
purposes and those inside the system who need
guidelines for their behaviour and thus attempt to construct a coherent system of orientation
in
their social environment.
Social categorization is one of these tools (cf. Tajfel,
1969, 1972b).
But the fact that this tool
exists (i.e. that it is a part of human cognitive equipment) provides
us
with
no
more information
as to whether, when or how it will be used than knowing that a man has bought a do-it-yourself
kit would by itself inform
us
whether, when, how and for what purposes he will use it. We only
know that there are some things he can do with his kit (there may be some we do not know
about
if
we underestimate his ingenuity); and we also know that some constructions are
definitely impossible because of the limitations of this particular box of tricks. For example: an
‘outside
’
observer may notice (and check with other outside observers) that
in
a society he is
looking at some individuals are ‘black’ and some are ‘white
’.
This information, however
‘objective’ it is, would not by itself enable him to conclude that his ‘black’- ‘white’ distinction
is one
on
which the tool kit of social categorizing has been put to use, i.e. that this distinction is
in
any way relevant to the social behaviour inside the system.
As
I wrote above, the aim of a theory of inter-group behaviour is to help
us
to understand
certain selected uniformities of social behaviour. In order to do this, we must know
(i)
something about the ways ‘groups’ are constructed in a particular social system, (ii) what are the
psychological effects of these constructions; and
(iii)
how the constructions and their effects
depend upon, and relate to, forms of social reality. These are the primary aims of the theory of
20448260a, 1979, 2, Downloaded from https://bpspsychub.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2044-8260.1979.tb00324.x by University College London, Wiley Online Library on [25/01/2026]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
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FAQs

What is the main argument of Tajfel's paper?
Henri Tajfel argues against the individualistic bias prevalent in social psychology, emphasizing that social behavior cannot be fully understood without considering the broader social context. He critiques existing theories for focusing predominantly on individual behavior while neglecting the dynamic interactions that occur within social systems. Tajfel advocates for a theory of inter-group behavior that integrates individual motivations with group processes, highlighting the importance of social categorization and identity.
How does Tajfel define social categorization?
Tajfel defines social categorization as a cognitive process that allows individuals to classify themselves and others into groups based on shared characteristics. This process is crucial for understanding social identity and influences how individuals perceive and interact with others. He argues that social categorization is not merely an individual cognitive function but is deeply embedded in the social context, affecting interpersonal relations and group dynamics.
What are the implications of Tajfel's theory for understanding prejudice?
Tajfel's theory suggests that prejudice arises from the social categorization process, where individuals identify with their ingroup and develop biases against outgroups. This perspective highlights how social identity influences attitudes and behaviors, leading to discrimination and conflict. By understanding the psychological mechanisms behind social categorization, researchers can better address the roots of prejudice and develop strategies for promoting intergroup harmony.
What is the significance of social identity in Tajfel's work?
Social identity is a central theme in Tajfel's work, as it shapes how individuals view themselves and their place within social structures. He posits that a positive social identity enhances self-esteem and influences behavior towards others. The interplay between social identity and group dynamics is crucial for understanding social behavior, particularly in contexts of conflict and cooperation.
How does Tajfel's work contribute to social psychology?
Tajfel's work significantly contributes to social psychology by challenging the dominant individualistic paradigms and advocating for a more holistic understanding of social behavior. His emphasis on the interaction between individual and group processes has paved the way for further research into group dynamics, social identity, and the psychological aspects of intergroup relations. This approach has important implications for addressing social issues such as prejudice and discrimination.

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