
1 Introduction
Starting in 2018, the US has been engaged in an unprecedented trade war involving broad
rounds of tariffs imposed on its trading partners (especially China) and equally broad retal-
iatory tariffs on US exports. An event of this magnitude is unseen in the post-war era, and
constitutes a major departure from a decades-long trajectory toward free trade. This trade war
constitutes an exceptional testing ground for the effects of trade policy.
In this paper, we assess the overall impact of the trade war on US exports. This overall
impact depends both on the direct effect of retaliatory tariffs on exports to retaliating countries
and on the extent to which exports can be rerouted to alternative markets. While the literature
has focused on the direct effect, our goal is to understand the full impact of the trade war on
US exports. In addition, a key goal of this paper is to understand the mechanisms behind both
the direct effect of tariffs and the rerouting of exports. We show that finacial conditions of
exporters (specifically, leverage ratios) and the stickiness of trading relationships play a key
role in shaping the response of US exports to tariffs.
To guide our analysis, we develop a theoretical model of US exporters facing foreign tariffs
and derive precise testable implications that we can map to the data. We consider a model of
US exporting firms selling to two markets, China and the rest of the world. In the original
Melitz [2003] model, as well as in other canonical models of international trade, a tariff in one
market does not affect a firm’s exports to other markets, because marginal cost is constant. For
this reason, we focus on an environment with an increasing marginal cost, as in Almunia et al.
[2021], in which China’s retaliatory tariff leads not only to a decline in exports to China, but
also to an increase in exports to the rest of the world. We incorporate the role of relationship
stickiness by adding a structure of firm–to–firm trade, a per–relationship fixed cost, and a
cost of terminating existing relationships. Under this structure, exporters are unwilling to
terminate unprofitable relationships in response to higher tariffs, and consequently exports
are more responsive to tariffs when relationship stickiness is low. We also incorporate the role
of finance following Manova [2013]. Exporters have a working capital requirement for their
fixed costs which is financed by borrowing. Under a higher leverage ratio, an exporter’s fixed
cost is higher, and an increase in China’s tariff has a higher probability of leading to terminating
relationships and reducing export volumes. Thus, this financial channel magnifies the decline
in exports to China. At the same time, the increasing marginal cost mechanism can lead to a
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