
Experimental methods have grown in importance in economics in the past 60 years. There have
been several broad stages in this evolution. In the 1960s there was the use of social experiments to
examine major policies in natural settings, in the 1970s there was the use of laboratory experiments to
test economic theories in artefactual settings closer to theory, in the 1990s there was the use of field
experiments to test economic theories in artefactual and natural settings closer to theory, and in the
2000s there was the use of randomized experimental interventions in developing countries. Along the
way, experimental designs evolved to address different question. The appropriate design depends on
the question being answered, and the type of inferences to be made.
It is perfectly appropriate for an experimental design not to have any randomization at all, such
as when one is evaluating whether double-oral auction markets converge to an equilibrium price
determined by induced demand and supply curves (e.g., Smith [1962]). Or when one is presenting
subjects with risky lottery choices in order to infer risk preferences, and test which theories of risk
preference characterize which individuals (e.g., Hey and Orme [1994]). And randomized interventions
are not unique to field settings, and have been widely used in laboratory experiments to study the
effects of futures markets on the informational efficiency of asset markets (e.g., Forsythe, Palfrey and
Plott [1984] and Friedman, Harrison and Salmon [1984]).
It is also perfectly appropriate for an experiment design to be initially tethered to some
economic theory, such as when selecting parameter values to equalize expected payoffs when evaluating
theoretical predictions from single-unit auctions with varying numbers of bidders (e.g., Cox, Roberson
and Smith [1982]). Or making sure that the key axioms of models of bargaining behavior are
operationalized when testing them (e.g., Roth and Malouf [1979]). And it is appropriate for
experimental designs to be motivated by the need to extend initial theories as suggested by prior
experiments, such as models of sealed-bid behavior (e.g., Cox, Smith and Walker [1984; §V]).
A general concern with experiments spanning this variety of applications in economics is the
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